



**DEUTSCHE  
PFANDBRIEFBANK**

# Remuneration Report 2025

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank Group

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## Note regarding rounding

Due to rounding, minor discrepancies may arise in this report when totalling figures and calculating percentages.

## Use of personal pronouns and gender-neutral terms

To improve readability, the masculine form is used for personal titles and terms referring to individuals. These terms apply to all genders.

# A. Foreword

Dear Shareholders, Dear Business Partners,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Supervisory Board and the Remuneration Control Committee, I present to you the Remuneration Report of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG (pbb) for the financial year 2025. This report outlines the key areas of focus of the Supervisory Board and the Remuneration Control Committee regarding the remuneration of the members of the Management Board. The Remuneration Report also explains the principles governing the remuneration of members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board. It provides information on the level and structure of remuneration for the financial year 2025. Furthermore, it describes how business results affect the variable remuneration of Management Board members.

## Focus of the activities of the Supervisory Board and the Remuneration Control Committee: Further development of the new remuneration system for the Management Board

A particular focus of our work in 2025 was on the further development of the new remuneration system for the Management Board presented in the previous year. The proposed revision of the remuneration system was not approved by the Annual General Meeting in 2025. We take note of this with respect.

The criticism expressed during the voting process was not directed at the fundamental concept of variable remuneration as a Performance Share Plan with performance measurement in the LTI aligned with long-term and share-related performance targets.

Rather, the investors' concerns related to specific, clearly defined aspects of the remuneration scheme's design. These included the proposed option to grant sign-on bonuses even in cases where they do not serve to compensate for variable remuneration lost from a previous employment relationship. Furthermore, the possibility of making adjustments to variable remuneration in the event of unforeseeable and uncontrollable changes in pbb's economic environment, and the provision for temporary deviations from the remuneration system, were deemed insufficiently defined. The absence of clearly defined Share Ownership Guidelines (SOGs) was also viewed critically.

The Supervisory Board discussed the points of criticism raised in 2025 in detail and addressed the relevant issues. Our overarching objective remains unchanged: a transparent, performance-based and, at the same time, sustainable remuneration system that supports pbb's long-term strategy, promotes responsible conduct and strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of the Management Board, shareholders and other stakeholders.

We intend to submit a revised version of the remuneration system to the 2026 Annual General Meeting for approval.

## Further activities of the Supervisory Board and the Remuneration Control Committee

In addition, the Supervisory Board dealt intensively with all matters relating to Management Board remuneration during the reporting year. These included, in particular, the setting and review of variable remuneration for 2024, including a malus review and backtesting, the setting of targets for 2025, the review of the appropriateness of remuneration levels and structure, and the ongoing consideration of relevant regulatory developments.

## Further development of the remuneration report

The remuneration report itself was approved by 50.18% of the vote at the 2025 Annual General Meeting. We regard this narrow margin of approval as a mandate from our shareholders to continue to monitor the structure of remuneration with great sensitivity and in close dialogue. The 2025 Remuneration Report takes account of the demand for greater transparency and presents the relevant targets and their achievement in a clear and comprehensible manner.

We would like to thank our shareholders and their representatives for the open and constructive dialogue. Your feedback is an essential part of the responsible and forward-looking development of our governance structures.

On behalf of the Supervisory Board and the Remuneration Control Committee, I would like to thank you for your trust and hope you find this report informative.

Dr Louis Hagen  
Chairman of the Supervisory Board  
Chairman of the Remuneration Control Committee

# B. Overview of Management Board remuneration

The following tables provide an overview of pbb’s remuneration system and structure.

The **first figure** shows the **individual components of the Management Board’s remuneration** and their **amounts**. A distinction is made between the Chairman of the Management Board (VV) and the ordinary members of the Management Board (OVM). Variable remuneration is shown separately for long-term performance measurement (LTI) and short-term performance measurement (STI).

## Remuneration system and remuneration structure


in Euro	Fixed Remuneration	Variable remuneration Reference value (100%)		Pension plan* (pension contribution)	Ancillary services	Total remuneration	Maximum remuneration
		STI	LTI				
VV	925.000	120.000	180.000	175.000	35.000	1.435.000	2.200.000
OVM (until 2024)	525.000	108.000	162.000	310.000	35.000	1.140.000	2.000.000
OVM (since 2025)	660.00	108.000	162.000	175.000	35.000	1.140.000	2.000.000

\* For defined benefit plans, pension expenses may differ; since 2016, only benefit commitments have been agreed in new contracts

Figure 1: Remuneration system and remuneration structure

The **second figure** provides an overview of the **calculation and payment of variable remuneration**:

## Allocation and payment of variable remuneration



The amount paid-out is also limited by a pool approach. The pool is also calculated on the basis of the 3-year average achievement of the institution’s targets. The sum of the payment amounts of all board members may not exceed the respective reference values x achievement of the institution’s targets. If the achievement of divisional or individual targets results in a higher value, this is reduced pro rata for all board members.

Figure 2: Allocation and payment of variable remuneration

## Share-based variable remuneration

The third and fourth figures explain the share-based variable remuneration.

**50%** of the variable remuneration of the members of the Management Board is **share-based**:

	2023 (n-2)	2024 (n-1)	2025 (n)	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032
Variable remuneration 2025 <b>Cash component</b> (50%)	Assessment -period			STI Cash Portion (20%)	LTI Cash Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Cash Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Cash Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Cash Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Cash Portion 1/5 (6%)	
Variable remuneration 2025 <b>Share component</b> (50%)				STI Share Portion (20%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)	LTI Share Portion 1/5 (6%)
Percentage of the total amount				20%	26%	12%	12%	12%	12%	6%

Figure 3: Share-based variable remuneration

For the years 2019–2024, **the following amounts** currently **deferred from variable remuneration** are predominantly **share-based**:

Deferred portions of variable remuneration from previous years (in cash / in shares)

Board member	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Total
Kay Wolf	-	-	-	-	-	73.869,10	73.869,10
	-	-	-	-	-	123.115,15	123.115,15
Dr. Pamela Hoerr <sup>1)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	67.462,15	67.462,15
	-	-	-	-	-	112.436,93	112.436,93
Thomas Köntgen	-	15.381,96	30.250,24	44.122,39	56.713,26	69.524,45	215.992,30
	14.630,37	30.763,92	45.375,36	58.829,85	70.891,57	115.874,08	321.734,78
Andreas Schenk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Marcus Schulte	-	15.683,89	30.184,30	44.296,47	59.803,40	72.591,95	222.560,01
	14.372,10	31.367,78	45.276,45	59.061,96	74.754,25	120.986,60	331.447,05
Andreas Arndt	-	15.583,25	30.250,24	44.799,38	57.258,58	66.558,80	214.450,24
	14.295,50	31.166,50	45.375,36	59.732,50	71.573,22	111.869,41	319.716,99

<sup>1)</sup> Dr. Pamela Hoerr joined pbb on 16 April 2023 and was appointed as a member of the Management Board of pbb with effect from 17 January 2024. Only information for the activity as a member of the Management Board is disclosed.

Figure 4: Overview of deferred (equity-based) variable remuneration

# C. Remuneration Report

The remuneration report complies with the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK) in its currently valid version. It contains the information required under commercial law (German Commercial Code, HGB) and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The remuneration report complies with the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

The remuneration report was prepared jointly by the Management Board and the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG. The auditor has formally reviewed the remuneration report to verify that the disclosures required under Section 162(1) and (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the content of the remuneration report has not been audited. The auditor's report pursuant to Section 162(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) is attached to the remuneration report.

## I. Basis for the remuneration of the Management Board

Remuneration strategy	The remuneration strategy is an integral part of the business and risk strategy. It sets out the framework for the performance and remuneration of the members of the Management Board. The aim of the remuneration strategy is to ensure appropriate and performance-based remuneration that is geared towards achieving the objectives enshrined in the business and risk strategy without taking on disproportionate risks.
Stakeholder interests	When designing the remuneration system and structure, and when determining the level of remuneration, the interests of the various stakeholders, in particular the shareholders, are taken into account at all times.
LTI	Long-term performance measurement (LTI) is carried out at the institutional level of pbb. The basis for measuring the institution's performance consists of key (core) performance indicators of the pbb Group, which are derived from the defined business and risk strategy and the resulting business planning, and which meet the regulatory requirements regarding the consideration of risks, capital and liquidity.
STI	Short-term performance measurement (STI) takes place at divisional and individual levels. To this end, specific quantitative and qualitative financial and non-financial targets are agreed between the Supervisory Board and the Management Board on the basis of performance criteria.
Long-term focus	Variable remuneration is designed to strengthen the long-term and sustainable development of the pbb Group. The LTI is weighted at 60% and the STI at 40% in the performance measurement. 50% of the total variable remuneration is structured as share-based payments. 60% of the total variable remuneration is subject to pro-rata vesting with a deferral period of 5 years in total.

Sustainability	The STI includes agreed sustainability-related targets from the ESG area, which contribute to the pbb Group's responsible and sustainable conduct in line with its sustainability strategy.
Appropriateness and caps	Assessing remuneration through horizontal comparisons with other companies and vertical comparisons with employees' remuneration, as well as the remuneration caps relating to variable remuneration and the maximum remuneration, play a significant role in determining the appropriateness of remuneration levels.
Transparency	By avoiding unnecessary complexity in the structures and through clear and comprehensible reporting, the transparency of the remuneration system is enhanced in line with shareholders' expectations and regulatory requirements.
Governance	The remuneration system and individual remuneration packages are structured in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements.

## II. Management Board Remuneration

In November 2015, the Supervisory Board approved the remuneration system for members of the Management Board, which has been in force since 1 January 2016. On 17 December 2018, the Supervisory Board resolved to adapt the remuneration system to the revised Regulation on the Supervisory Requirements for Institutions' Remuneration Systems ("IVV") of 4 August 2017, with effect from 1 January 2018, and implemented this decision. On 6 November 2020, following consultation with the Remuneration Control Committee, the Supervisory Board adapted the remuneration system to the new requirements of ARUG II and adopted it. The 2021 Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration system with approximately 95.42% of the valid votes cast. The 2024 Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration report for the 2023 financial year with 65.74% of the valid votes cast. The new remuneration system presented at the 2025 Annual General Meeting was not approved and was consequently not implemented. The remuneration report for the 2024 financial year was approved with 50.18% of the valid votes cast.

The remuneration system presented at the 2025 Annual General Meeting is currently being further developed by the Company, as briefly mentioned at the beginning of the foreword to this remuneration report. The remuneration system thus further developed will be resubmitted to the 2026 Annual General Meeting for approval and is intended to come into force retroactively with effect from 1 January 2026 for all members of the Management Board. A detailed description of the new remuneration system will be published on the pbb Group's website together with the invitation to the 2026 Annual General Meeting.

### 1. REMUNERATION STRUCTURE

The remuneration of pbb's Management Board members consists of fixed remuneration components that are not performance-related and performance-related variable remuneration.

The **fixed remuneration components not linked to performance** comprise the annual base salary, fringe benefits (in particular non-cash benefits) and the company pension scheme.

The **performance-related variable remuneration** is paid in cash and is half dependent on the performance of pbb's share price (equity-based remuneration scheme).

The determination of remuneration for members of the Management Board is intended to ensure performance-based pay and to take into account the size of the company and its international operations. This involves a comparison on the one hand with the remuneration of Management Board members at comparable companies in Germany and abroad (**horizontal remuneration comparison** based on the remuneration of Management Board members) and, on the other hand, with the remuneration of employees who report directly to the Management Board members (second management level), as well as with the other employees of the pbb Group (**vertical remuneration comparison**). Furthermore, the economic and financial situation of the pbb Group is also taken into account when determining remuneration.

In the context of the **horizontal remuneration comparison**, the Supervisory Board uses the following **reference group** (as at November 2025):

Benchmark group for the comparative analysis of the Management Board's remuneration

Berlin Hyp AG	Landesbank Baden-Württemberg
Münchener Hypothekbank eG	Hamburg Commercial Bank AG
Aareal Bank AG	UniCredit Bank AG
DZ Hyp AG	Commerzbank AG
Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale	DZ Bank AG

The peer group remains unchanged from the previous year and is reviewed regularly.

Figure 4: Appropriateness of remuneration – peer group 2025

To carry out the horizontal remuneration comparison, pbb positions itself within the peer group on the basis of the key figures usually used for this purpose: total assets and number of employees.

## 2. NON-PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION

Fixed remuneration components that are not performance-related include the **annual base salary**, **fringe benefits** (in particular non-cash benefits) and the **company pension scheme**.

### a. Non-performance-related remuneration components

#### Annual base salary

The **annual base salary** is a fixed annual salary paid in twelve equal monthly instalments. It is reviewed at regular intervals against external market comparisons and adjusted where necessary. There is no automatic adjustment.

#### Fringe benefits

In addition, pbb grants members of the Management Board **fringe benefits** (non-cash benefits) to the usual extent. These include, in particular, the following fringe benefits:

- pbb provides each member of the Management Board with a company car and driver, which may also be used for private purposes. Against the backdrop of the bank-wide phasing out of company cars, pbb grants members of the Management Board a payment of equivalent economic value upon expiry of the respective lease agreement. The last lease agreements expired in 2025.
- Members of the Management Board are covered by pbb's D&O insurance.
- pbb reimburses members of the Management Board for the employer's contribution to health and long-term care insurance.
- Relocation costs are covered to the usual extent and amount, particularly in the case of new appointments.

- In the event of maintaining two households, pbb covers the travel costs for a weekly journey home to the previous place of residence and, in principle for a limited period of two years, the costs of a second home at the place of work.
- A group accident insurance policy (covering death and disability) is in place for the members of the Management Board.

Taxes on non-cash benefits relating to all of the aforementioned fringe benefits are borne by the members of the Management Board themselves.

### Company pension scheme

Members of the Management Board are also entitled to a **company pension scheme**, which is described in a separate section below.

#### b. Non-performance-related remuneration for the 2025 financial year

The fixed remuneration for the Chairman of the Management Board, Kay Wolf, is €925,000 gross per annum; for the other members of the Management Board, it is €525,000 gross per annum, and for members of the Management Board who join in or after the 2025 financial year, it is €660,000 gross per annum (the increase in fixed remuneration is linked to the reduction in pension benefits). The fixed remuneration for the former Chairman of the Management Board, Andreas Arndt, who stepped down in 2024, was €550,000 gross per year; the fixed remuneration for Management Board member Andreas Schenk, who left in March 2025, was €78,750 gross per full month in the year of his departure.

## 3. PERFORMANCE-RELATED VARIABLE REMUNERATION

The variable remuneration complies with the regulatory requirements under the CRD, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/923, the German Banking Act (KWG) and the IVV, as well as the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) and, in principle, the requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code (DCGK). With regard to the deviations from the DCGK in relation to the IVV, reference is made to the declaration of conformity pursuant to Section 161 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

#### a. Calculatory reference value

Variable remuneration is determined on the basis of a **calculatory reference value** agreed individually with the respective member of the Management Board in their employment contract. The calculatory reference value is expressed as an annual amount. This is a **calculatory value** that reflects the level of variable remuneration to be awarded based on **100% target achievement in the LTI and STI**. In the event of the employment relationship commencing or terminating during the year, the calculatory reference value is reduced pro rata in relation to the full year. This also applies to absences due to illness or other reasons where there is no statutory or contractual entitlement to continued remuneration, as well as to periods during which the employment relationship is suspended.

The annual calculatory reference value for Kay Wolf is €300,000. The annual calculatory reference values for the other members of the Management Board are €270,000 each. The annual calculatory reference value for Andreas Arndt was €315,000, and for Andreas Schenk €160,000 in the year of his departure.

The variable remuneration allocated to a member of the Management Board for one year may amount to a maximum of 150% of the individual calculatory reference value.

Pursuant to Section 25a(5) sentence 2 of the German Banking Act (KWG), variable remuneration may under no circumstances exceed 100% of the fixed remuneration. This could be raised to up to 200% by a resolution of pbb's Annual General Meeting. pbb has not yet brought about such a resolution at the Annual General Meeting.

#### b. Setting of targets

Before the start of each financial year, the Supervisory Board sets quantitative and qualitative targets for the members of the Management Board. As outlined above, the setting of targets is based on the business and risk strategy. In addition,

the quantitative targets are mapped out on the basis of the multi-year plan, depending on the areas of responsibility of the Management Board members. The setting of targets aims at performance-oriented, sustainable and long-term corporate management.

### Long-term performance measurement (LTI)

Prior to the start of each financial year, the Supervisory Board determines the LTI on the recommendation of the Remuneration Control Committee. The performance metrics for the LTI are the institution's targets. As part of this process, the Supervisory Board also sets the target value for 100% target achievement.

The LTI is calculated as the sum of two key performance indicators, each accounting for 50%: the **degree of target achievement for profit before tax (adjusted)** and the **return-to-risk ratio ('ERR ratio')**:

Key Performance Indicators	Definition	Weighting
Profit before tax	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Corresponds to the balance sheet profit before tax (IFRS, Group)</li> <li>* Reflects the Bank's overall profit for which it is jointly responsible</li> </ul>	50%
Return-to-risk ratio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Equivalent to the net margin on retail business multiplied by the portfolio volume by risk-weighted assets</li> <li>* Reflects client profitability and risk allocation</li> </ul>	50%

Figure 5: LTI – Key Performance Indicators

The Supervisory Board sets the target value for the institution's performance no later than the start of the financial year. In doing so, the target value for profit before tax (adjusted) is defined as a euro amount and the target value for the ERR ratio as a percentage.

For the relevant target achievement in the LTI, one-third each of the institution's targets for the remuneration year and the two preceding years are relevant.

The **LTI**, with a **weighting of 60%**, is the **decisive factor for the overall target achievement** of the members of the Management Board for a financial year.

### Short-term performance measurement (STI)

**Departmental and individual targets** are agreed with each member of the Management Board as part of **the STI**. These contribute a total of **40% to target achievement** and are derived from the **institution's targets** and the plans for the respective financial year, in line with the long-term or sustainable business strategy.

The Supervisory Board, acting on the recommendation of the Remuneration Control Committee, sets quantitative and qualitative targets, assessment criteria and target values for 100% target achievement, as well as the weighting of the targets.

Details of the targets set for the 2025 financial year and the achievement of these targets can be found in the section 'Targets and Target Achievement for the 2025 Financial Year'.

#### c. Setting of targets

At the end of each financial year, the Supervisory Board decides, on the recommendation of the Remuneration Control Committee, to what extent the targets have been achieved.

For the measurement of target achievement, the **LTI** is weighted **at 60%** and the **departmental/individual performance (STI) at 40%**. Target achievement is determined on the basis of the assessment criteria or target values established during the target-setting process.

### Long-term performance measurement (LTI)

The LTI target achievement relevant to variable remuneration depends one-third each on the institution's performance in the remuneration year and the two preceding financial years. To this end, the target values for the respective financial year are compared with the actual values achieved at year-end, and the percentage of target achievement is calculated from this. The average percentage of target achievement for the **three relevant financial years** is then calculated.

Should exceptional circumstances arise that are beyond the control of the pbb Group, the Supervisory Board may, in accordance with Recommendation G.11 of the DCGK, increase or reduce the target achievement at institutional level by up to 20 percentage points. This allows for positive and negative external influences on target achievement to be taken into account in an appropriate manner. Such influences may include, for example, short-term changes to general regulatory requirements material to the pbb Group, short-term fundamental macroeconomic events, external trade restrictions and one-off effects arising from the acquisition or disposal of material business units, particularly in the case of externally triggered M&A activity.

### Short-term performance measurement (STI)

The determination of STI target achievement is carried out separately for each target. For quantitative targets, this is done by comparing the defined target value for 100% target achievement with the actual values achieved. For qualitative targets, the Supervisory Board carries out an evaluative assessment of performance based on the predefined target value for 100% target achievement. For each member of the Management Board, the average value (weighted according to the target definition) of the percentage target achievement for the individual targets is calculated at both departmental and individual levels.

Target achievement can range from 0% to 150% in both the LTI and the STI, and is therefore capped at 150%.

### Result: Envisaged Personal Reward Value ('EPR Value')

On the basis of the target achievement determined above, a **proportion of the calculatory reference value is calculated** for each member of the Management Board as a variable remuneration amount for the financial year as follows (**the "EPR value"**):

- In a first step, the **total amount of the Management Board members' variable remuneration** is determined. To this end, the calculatory reference values of the Management Board members are added together and multiplied by the LTI target achievement, i.e. the average percentage of target achievement at institution level for the three relevant financial years. The total amount of variable remuneration thus calculated is allocated to the two levels of performance measurement, with **60% allocated to the LTI ('institutional pool')** and **40% to the STI ('departmental and individual pool')**.
- In a second step, the **institutional pool (60%)** is allocated to the members of the Management Board. To this end, the institutional pool is distributed among the members of the Management Board. The allocation is weighted according to the amount of the respective calculatory reference value of the Management Board member.

At the combined level of **departmental and individual performance**, the **departmental and individual pool (40%)** is distributed among the members of the Management Board. The distribution is weighted according to the amount of the respective calculatory reference value of the Management Board member. This amount is then multiplied by the average percentage of target achievement for the individual targets at departmental and individual level. If the departmental and individual pool is insufficient to account for the target achievement measured for all targets at the departmental and individual levels, a pro rata reduction shall be made accordingly.

- In a third step, the **EPR value** is calculated for each member of the Management Board as **the sum of the value of the LTI and the value of the STI**. In principle, the calculated allocation of the EPR value for an individual member of the Management Board may range from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 150% of the relevant calculatory reference value.

When determining the EPR value, the Supervisory Board takes into account whether the Management Board member can be accused of any **conduct contrary to ethical standards or breach of duty** during the relevant assessment period. It examines any **negative contributions to performance** within the meaning of Section 18(5) of the IVV ('malus test') and the **financial payment conditions under Section 7 of the IVV**. On the basis of this review, the Supervisory Board may or must reduce the EPR value (for details of the penalty and clawback provisions, see p. 15). The Supervisory Board

may also cap the EPR value in the event of **exceptional developments** (e.g. windfall profits) or where the amount is exceptionally high.

#### Calculatory Reference Value – Total amount of variable remuneration - EPR




Figure 6: Calculation of the EPR value (illustrative example assuming 100% target achievement at all levels of performance measurement).

#### d. Assessment of conditions pursuant to Section 7 IVV

A prerequisite for the granting and payment of variable remuneration to members of the Management Board is the prior **determination of a total amount of variable remuneration** by the Supervisory Board (taking into account the requirements of Section 7 of the IVV). This amount is determined at the end of each financial year in accordance with the statutory requirements. The Supervisory Board uses relevant restructuring thresholds from the restructuring plan as indicators of the need for a more detailed examination of the statutory requirements. If the statutory requirements are met, a total amount for variable remuneration is made available. If the statutory requirements are not met, or are met only to a limited extent, the Supervisory Board must reduce the variable remuneration or withhold it.

In the 2025 financial year, pbb recorded a balance sheet loss before tax of €250 million under IFRS, which is predominantly attributable to one-off expenses arising from the strategic withdrawal from the US property market. These one-off special effects have significantly influenced the annual result, but do not reflect the operational performance of the core business in Germany and Europe. New business increased by around 23% to €6.3 billion, whilst the return on tangible equity (RoTE) for new business stood at around 8%, meaning that key strategic performance indicators were achieved despite the challenging market environment. The Bank continues to have a robust capital base with a CET1 ratio of 14.9% and a comfortable liquidity reserve of around €5 billion, which ensures financial stability and enables the implementation of strategic initiatives.

The process for determining the total amount of variable remuneration for the performance year takes into account not only the impact on the current year, but also on future years. Taking into account the expenditure still required in 2026 for the withdrawal from the US property market, a positive net profit for the Bank can already be expected for the 2026 financial year, with a significant increase in subsequent years.

Against this background, the Management Board and Supervisory Board have reviewed the sustainability of variable remuneration. Despite the negative annual result, pbb's capital and liquidity positions are well above the regulatory minimum requirements, meaning that the key sustainability parameters are met.

Against this background, the Supervisory Board of pbb has decided to grant the members of the Management Board variable remuneration for the 2025 financial year. Accordingly, the Management Board has made a decision regarding the variable remuneration of employees. This decision reflects the clear distinction between one-off balance sheet charges and sustainable operational profitability. It rewards the results achieved in the core business and ensures that the Bank maintains its ability to retain and motivate key staff, who are crucial to the consistent implementation of the Bank's transformation and the achievement of long-term capital market objectives.

The bonus pool is to be distributed on the basis of target achievement of approximately 66% for Management Board members and approximately 41% for employees. The institutional target achievement relevant to Management Board members is calculated as the average of target achievement for the years 2023–2025; for employees, only the year 2025 is relevant. This corresponds to a total of €4.90 million (this includes the variable remuneration component for employees and the Management Board). The impact on the equity position is not material for this amount.

#### e. Payment structure: short- and long-term variable remuneration

As a significant institution within the meaning of Section 1(3c) of the German Banking Act (KWG), pbb must, in particular, comply with the **requirements of Section 20 of the IVV regarding the variable remuneration of risk-takers**. Members of the Management Board are risk-takers. The payment structure for the variable remuneration of Management Board members is therefore generally subject to the following framework conditions:

The EPR value is divided into a **payout portion** and a **deferral portion**.

For members of the Management Board, the payout portion amounts to 40% of the respective EPR value, and the deferral portion to 60% of the weighted EPR value.

##### Payout portion: 40% of the respective EPR value

50% of the payout portion is generally paid out in cash at the end of the first half of the financial year following the remuneration year, and no later than September of that year, provided that the payout conditions under Section 7 of the IVV are met.

The remaining 50% of the payout portion is paid out after a **one-year holding period**, with this amount being adjusted in line with the **performance of the pbb share price** during the holding period.

In doing so, the corresponding amount is converted into an equivalent number of virtual shares at the start of the holding period. The average Xetra closing price of the pbb share in February of the year following the financial year for which the variable remuneration is granted (reference price) applies to the calculation of the number of virtual shares. The virtual shares determined in this way are automatically converted into a cash amount after a one-year holding period and paid out together with the variable remuneration for the financial year following the remuneration year. The conversion is based on the average Xetra closing price of the pbb share in February of the year of payment (payment price). 50% of the payment portion of the EPR value thus participates directly in the performance of the pbb share during the holding period.

##### Deferral portion: 60% of the respective EPR value

The **deferral period** for the deferral portion is a total of **five years** for members of the Management Board.

The Supervisory Board decides annually, in each of the five years following the determination of the EPR value, on the award of one-fifth of the deferred portion. No entitlement to the relevant remuneration components arises until the end of

the respective deferral period. If the deferred remuneration components become vested for the members of the Management Board of , half of the respective deferral portion is paid out in cash. The other half is retained for a further year, adjusted during the one-year holding period in line with the share price performance and, during this further holding period, depends on sustainable performance in accordance with the share-based sustainability component described above.

When deciding on the grant or re-determination of a deferral portion at the end of the annual deferral period, the Supervisory Board takes the following aspects into account:

- **Backtesting:** As part of a retrospective review of variable remuneration (ex-post risk adjustment), the Supervisory Board examines negative deviations that have occurred retrospectively in relation to the institution's performance, the performance of the organisational unit and individual performance ('backtesting'). Through this retrospective performance assessment, the Supervisory Board verifies whether the originally determined target achievement remains accurate in retrospect, e.g. whether risks were underestimated or failed to be identified, or whether unexpected losses occurred. If, in the course of backtesting, the Supervisory Board identifies such shortfalls in target achievement, the deferral portion must be reduced to the extent necessary to lower the variable remuneration to the newly determined level.
- **Conduct contrary to ethical standards and duties:** Furthermore, the Supervisory Board examines whether the relevant member of the Management Board can be accused of any conduct contrary to ethical standards and duties during the relevant assessment period. This necessarily leads to a reduction in the deferral portion and cannot be offset by positive contributions to performance.
- **Malus and clawback assessment:** In addition, the Supervisory Board reviews any negative performance contributions within the meaning of Section 18(5) of the IVV ('malus test') and, particularly in the event of serious misconduct by a member of the Management Board, has the option of cancelling variable remuneration components that have not yet been paid out or reclaiming variable remuneration components already paid out from the member of the Management Board ('malus and clawback provision').

pbb has entered into agreements with the members of the Management Board regarding the recovery of variable remuneration ("clawback agreement"). Accordingly, any claims for payment of variable remuneration for the relevant assessment period that have not yet been paid shall lapse, or the member of the Management Board shall be obliged to repay the variable remuneration already paid for the relevant assessment period, if they were significantly involved in or responsible for conduct that led to substantial losses for the institution or a significant regulatory sanction. The same applies if the member of the Management Board has seriously breached relevant external or internal regulations regarding suitability and conduct. pbb may reclaim variable remuneration already paid out up to two years after the expiry of the retention period for the relevant financial year. The detailed specification of the clawback criteria set out in the IVV takes into account the requirements of the supervisory authority and applies them – against the backdrop of the specific features of the pbb Group's business model and risk profile – with a view to the sustainability of the company's success and the alignment of corporate success with bonus payments.

**Payment conditions, Section 7 IVV:** Finally, the Supervisory Board reviews the financial payment conditions in accordance with Section 7 IVV. On the basis of this review, the Supervisory Board may reduce or withhold the variable remuneration of a member of the Management Board.

**Disbursement structure for variable remuneration of Board members**  
(Example: final EPR value 300 000 Euro)




Figure 7: Payment system for the variable remuneration of members of the Management Board (illustrative); figures in thousands of €.

If the employment relationship of a member of the Management Board ends as a so-called 'bad leaver', the Supervisory Board shall decide at its reasonable discretion whether and to what extent the portions of the variable remuneration that had not yet been re-determined at the time of receipt of the notice of termination shall lapse. A member of the Management Board is deemed a 'bad leaver' if their employment relationship ends (also) as a result of a legally valid extraordinary termination by the company or an unjustified extraordinary termination by the member of the Management Board. If the employment relationship ends before the portion of the variable remuneration that has not yet been determined has been paid in full, without the member of the Management Board being a 'bad leaver', the provisions regarding the payment structure and due date remain unaffected.

#### f. Prohibition of hedging measures (Section 8 IVV)

The risk adjustment of the variable remuneration must not be restricted or negated by hedging or other countermeasures. Consequently, the following are prohibited, amongst other things: contracts with third parties that oblige the third party to make direct or indirect compensation payments to the member of the Management Board in the amount of the reduction in variable remuneration suffered (insurance), as well as derivative transactions to hedge against price losses on pbb's financial instruments.

The pbb Group has taken measures to prevent such hedging and other countermeasures by members of the Management Board. The prohibition on hedging transactions and other countermeasures is also regulated in individual contracts.

## 4. TARGETS AND TARGET ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE 2025 FINANCIAL YEAR

At its meeting on 14 March 2025, the Supervisory Board set the targets and, at its meeting on 13 February 2026, assessed the extent to which the LTI and STI targets for the members of the Management Board had been met for the 2025 financial year.

### a. LTI target achievement

With guidance for adjusted profit before tax slightly below the previous year's figure and an ERR target of 2.87%, the institution's performance fell short of the set target by **41.08%**.

The average percentage target achievement for the three financial years relevant to the LTI (2025, 2024 and 2023) is 66.31%.

## b. STI target achievement

The departmental and individual targets for the financial year 2025, as well as the target achievement rates, are set out below:

Board member	Departmental and individual targets	Target Achievement
Kay Wolf	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 90% - 120%
	2. ESG "E"	Ø 104%
	3. ESG "S"	
	4. Strengthening cultural development	
	5. Strengthening internal and stakeholder communication	

**Kay Wolf** has fully achieved his departmental and individual targets overall. The majority of Kay Wolf's departmental and individual targets centred on the strategic development of the pbb Group and internal and stakeholder communication. Whilst the external guidance could not be met due to the decision to withdraw from the US, key strategic projects of significance for pbb's future – in particular those aimed at creating an efficient target operating model and diversifying the business – were successfully completed. Amid a continuing phase of high market uncertainty regarding pbb's future, intensive internal and external communication with all relevant stakeholders once again contributed to Mr Wolf's successful achievement of his objectives. In 2025, Mr Wolf also provided important impetus for the implementation of the Bank's ESG strategy and had a lasting impact on the cultural transformation and implementation of pbb's leadership principles. By contrast, the target of increasing the proportion of women in management positions was not achieved in 2025 either. To significantly reduce the risk arising from the US business, an SRT (Significant Risk Transfer) was successfully implemented in December. This complex transaction required a significant amount of work and contributes significantly to reducing the risks on the Bank's balance sheet.

Member of the Management Board	Departmental and individual targets	Achievement of targets
Dr Pamela Hoerr	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 90%–100%
	2. Strategic development of pbb invest	Ø 98%
	3. ESG "E"	
	4. ESG "S"	
	5. Strengthening cultural development	

**Dr Pamela Hoerr** has met her departmental and individual targets. The successful acquisition of the DI Group, with €3 billion in assets under management, has successfully laid the foundations for growth at pbb invest. Although no equity commitments for new fund products could be secured due to continued weak investor interest in property investments, Dr Hoerr succeeded in initiating important mandates for debt fund products. Furthermore, a strong team was established in the Originate & Cooperate business area and a broad partner base was built up, even though no deals have yet been closed. In 2025, Dr Hoerr continued to shape the implementation of the cultural transformation process and the application of leadership principles within the bank. She is primarily responsible for the bank's ESG programme, which has met its targets for 2025. By contrast, the proportion of women in leadership positions across the organisation has not increased.

Member of the Management Board	Departmental and individual targets	Target achievement
Thomas Köntgen	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 90% - 100%
	2. ESG "E"	
	3. ESG "S"	Ø 94%
	4. Strengthening cultural development	
	5. REF sales targets	

**Thomas Köntgen** has almost fully achieved his departmental and individual targets. The implementation of the strategy to strengthen the core business – commercial real estate financing – through portfolio diversification has been successfully launched. The new Loan Management division marked an important milestone for a successful Target Operating Model within the REFS division, by consolidating sales, credit and operations tasks into a customer-focused deal management unit capable of managing transactions throughout the entire cycle. In new business, margin targets were almost met in a difficult market environment, although the planned volume could not be achieved. However, the profitability of new business was significantly increased. The share of green loans in new business, as well as the decarbonisation targets, were almost achieved. His valuable contribution to the successful implementation of the SRT is also worth mentioning.

Member of the Management Board	Departmental and individual targets	Target achievement
Jörn Joseph	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 95% - 115%
	2. ESG "E"	
	3. ESG "S"	Ø 104%
	4. Management of non-performing loans	
	5. Risk models	
	6. Implementation of the risk strategy	
	7. Strengthening cultural development	

**Jörn Joseph**, who joined the pbb Management Board as Chief Risk Officer on 1 June 2025, has settled into his new role extremely successfully in a very short space of time and has already provided important strategic impetus, which has had a positive impact on his achievement of objectives in his work on the Management Board as CRO. For instance, despite a high non-performing portfolio, Mr Joseph succeeded in reducing NPLs through active management and great personal commitment, particularly in the US portfolio. He also played a key role in the successful implementation of the SRT. Under his leadership, the bank continued to focus intensively on the further development of the model landscape in 2025 and was able, amongst other things, to substantially revise the ICAAP models. Mr Joseph also played a key role in establishing the Target Operating Model for the risk division, thereby laying the foundations for a reorientation of the CRM division. Mr Joseph largely achieved the ESG-related targets. The primary process proved to be extremely effective in 2025 as well, as evidenced by the very high approval rate in the Credit Committee.

Member of the Management Board	Departmental and individual targets	Achievement of objectives
Marcus Schulte	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 90%–120%
	2. ESG "E"	Ø 104%
	3. ESG "S"	
	4. Funding	
	5. Strengthening investor communication	
	6. Strengthening cultural development	
	7. Stable and efficient IT operations	

In his role as Treasurer and CFO, **Marcus Schulte** very successfully implemented the Bank's financing strategy in what was another challenging year and exceeded his targets. A Tier 2 issue of €300 million, the issuance of a green senior bond and two significantly oversubscribed Pfandbrief issues were all successfully completed. The resilience of the Bank's refinancing was once again impressively demonstrated on both the secured and unsecured sides. A particular focus for Mr Schulte in 2025 was on intensive capital markets communication and strategically oriented investor relations work. In 2025, Marcus Schulte also focused on managing the resolution of supervisory findings in IT and played a leading role in communications with the supervisory authority. Furthermore, IT made a significant contribution to cost reduction through various measures in 2025.

Member of the Management Board	Departmental and individual targets	Achievement of objectives
Andreas Schenk	1. Strategic development of pbb	Range: 0% - 100%
	2. Management of non-performing loans	Ø 63%
	3. Preparation and handover of departmental responsibilities to the incoming board members	

**Andreas Schenk** was unable to achieve a reduction in the non-performing portfolio in the year of his departure from the Management Board. However, his objectives regarding the design of the target operating model for his department and the handover of his responsibilities to the other Management Board members were achieved.

### c. Withheld variable remuneration for previous years

At its meeting on 13 February 2026, the Supervisory Board decided on the recalculation of deferral portions for variable remuneration for the years 2020 to 2024. The Supervisory Board's review of the conditions for a malus and/or clawback found no grounds for action. Andreas Schenk's target achievement for 2024 was reassessed and adjusted as part of the backtesting process.

## 5. REMUNERATION GRANTED AND PAYABLE TO MANAGEMENT BOARD MEMBERS ACTIVE IN THE 2025 FINANCIAL YEAR

The following tables show the remuneration granted and payable to the members of the Management Board active in the 2025 financial year in the 2025 and 2024 financial years, respectively, in accordance with Section 162(1) sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

The tables contain all amounts granted for work performed in the financial year being reported on ('remuneration granted'). This comprises, on the one hand, the fixed salary and fringe benefits granted and, on the other hand, the one-year and multi-year variable remuneration, each of which is partly share-based. In the case of variable remuneration, the figure reported is the amount at which it was initially set by the Supervisory Board for the respective financial year. This serves to ensure transparent and comprehensible reporting, demonstrating the link between the performance of the respective Management Board member and the remuneration granted for this during the reporting period, even if payment of the variable components in particular is only made after the end of the respective financial year.

In addition, the tables include, on a voluntary basis, all amounts received by the respective Management Board member in the 2025 or 2024 financial year from variable remuneration relating to previous years.

Pension costs for the company pension scheme are reported separately in the section 'Pension commitments'.

Due to rounding, minor discrepancies may arise in the calculation of totals and percentages.

## Kay Wolf

Chairman of the Management Board (CEO)

in thousands of euros	2025		2024	
	In thousands of euros	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
Fixed remuneration	925	78%	848	61%
Additional benefits <sup>1)</sup>	55	5%	43	3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>980</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>891</b>	<b>64%</b>
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
Annual variable remuneration	41	3%	49	4%
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	49	4%
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	41	3%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	30	2%
Deferral (Q2 2027)	24	2%	30	2%
Deferral (Q2 2028)	24	2%	30	2%
Deferral (Q2 2029)	24	2%	30	2%
Deferral (Q2 2030)	24	2%	30	2%
Deferral (Q2 2031)	24	2%	-	-
Special payment <sup>2)</sup>	-	-	250	18%
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>1,182</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,389</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Supplementary, voluntary information</b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	49	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2018	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2017	-	-	-	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation.

<sup>2)</sup> Kay Wolf was granted a one-off sign-on bonus, which became payable at the start of the term.

## Dr Pamela Hoerr

REIS

in thousands of €	2025		2024	
	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
<b>Fixed remuneration</b>				
Fixed remuneration	525	72%	502	66%
Additional benefits <sup>1)</sup>	31	4%	30	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>70%</b>
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
One-year variable remuneration	36	5%	45	6%
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	45	6%
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	36	5%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	27	4%
Deferral (Q2 2027)	21	3%	27	4%
Deferral (Q2 2028)	21	3%	27	4%
Deferral (Q2 2029)	21	3%	27	4%
Deferral (Q2 2030)	21	3%	27	4%
Deferral (Q2 2031)	21	3%	-	-
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>733</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>757</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Supplementary, voluntary information<sup>2)</sup></b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	45	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2018	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2017	-	-	-	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation.

<sup>2)</sup> Dr Pamela Hoerr joined pbb on 16 April 2023 and was appointed to the pbb Management Board with effect from 17 January 2024. Only information relating to her role as a member of the Management Board is disclosed.

## Thomas Köntgen

Deputy Chairman,  
REFS

in €'000	2025		2024	
	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
Fixed remuneration				
Fixed remuneration	525	72%	525	67%
Ancillary benefits <sup>1)</sup>	31	4%	31	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>556</b>	<b>71%</b>
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
One-year variable remuneration	35	5%	46	6%
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	46	6%
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	35	5%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	28	4%
Deferral (Q2 2027)	21	3%	28	4%
Deferral (Q2 2028)	21	3%	28	4%
Deferral (Q2 2029)	21	3%	28	4%
Deferral (Q2 2030)	21	3%	28	4%
Deferral (Q2 2031)	21	3%	-	-
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>731</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Supplementary, voluntary information<sup>2)</sup></b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	46	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	77	-	47	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	24	-	38	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	23	-	21	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	26	-	23	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	20	-	19	-
Variable remuneration from 2018	8	-	21	-
Variable remuneration from 2017	-	-	5	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation.

<sup>2)</sup> Breakdown of variable remuneration received by the member of the Management Board in the 2025 and 2024 financial years, respectively, relating to previous years.

The portions of variable remuneration received in the 2025 financial year from multi-year remuneration relating to previous years are, due to the performance of the share-based variable remuneration, a total of €17,000 lower than the amount set at the start of the vesting period in each case.

## Jörn Joseph

CRO (from 06/2025)

in € thousand	2025		2024	
	In thousands of euros	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
<b>Fixed remuneration</b>				
Fixed remuneration	385	56%	-	-
Additional benefits <sup>1)</sup>	14	2%	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>58%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
Annual variable remuneration	21	3%	-	-
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	-	-
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	21	3%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2027)	13	2%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2028)	13	2%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2029)	13	2%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2030)	13	2%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2031)	13	2%	-	-
Special payment <sup>2)</sup>	200	29%	-	-
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Additional, optional information<sup>3)</sup></b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2018	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2017	-	-	-	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation..

<sup>2)</sup> Jörn Joseph was granted a one-off sign-on bonus, which became due at the start of the term of office.

<sup>3)</sup> Breakdown of the variable remuneration received by the Management Board member in the 2025 and 2024 financial years, respectively, from previous years.

## Marcus Schulte

CFO

in €'000	2025		2024	
	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
Fixed remuneration	525	72%	525	67%
Fixed remuneration	525	72%	525	67%
Additional benefits <sup>1)</sup>	23	3%	13	2%
Total	548	75%	538	69%
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
One-year variable remuneration	36	5%	48	6%
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	48	6%
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	36	5%	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	29	4%
Deferral (Q2 2027)	22	3%	29	4%
Deferral (Q2 2028)	22	3%	29	4%
Deferral (Q2 2029)	22	3%	29	4%
Deferral (Q2 2030)	22	3%	29	4%
Deferral (Q2 2031)	22	3%	-	-
Total remuneration	730	100%	779	100%
<b>Supplementary, voluntary information<sup>2)</sup></b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	48	-	50	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	82	-	38	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	24	-	21	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	23	-	24	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	26	-	19	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2018 <sup>3)</sup>	-	-	-	-
Variable remuneration from 2017 <sup>3)</sup>	-	-	-	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation.

<sup>2)</sup> Breakdown of variable remuneration received by the member of the Management Board in the 2025 and 2024 financial years, respectively, from previous years.

<sup>3)</sup> Marcus Schulte joined pbb on 1 January 2017 and was appointed a member of the pbb Management Board with effect from 1 January 2019. Only information relating to his role as a member of the Management Board is disclosed.

The portions of variable remuneration received in the 2025 financial year from multi-year remuneration relating to previous years are, due to the performance of the share-based variable remuneration, a total of €10,000 lower than the amount set at the start of the holding period.

## Andreas Schenk

CRO (until 03/2025)

in € thousand	2025		2024	
	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration	In thousands of €	as a % of total remuneration
Fixed remuneration	202	26%	543	68%
Ancillary benefits <sup>1)</sup>	8	1%	29	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>572</b>	<b>72%</b>
<b>Variable remuneration for the financial year</b>				
One-year variable remuneration	19	3%	45	6%
Multi-year variable remuneration				
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2026)	-	-	45	6%
Payout portion with holding period (Q2 2027)	-	-	-	-
Deferral (Q2 2026)	-	-	27	3%
Deferral (Q2 2027)	-	-	27	3%
Deferral (Q2 2028)	-	-	27	3%
Deferral (Q2 2029)	-	-	27	3%
Deferral (Q2 2030)	-	-	27	3%
Deferral (Q2 2031)	-	-	-	-
Severance pay	555	71%	-	-
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>797</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Supplementary, voluntary information<sup>2)</sup></b>				
Variable remuneration from 2024	45	-	48	-
Variable remuneration from 2023	78	-	39	-
Variable remuneration from 2022	25	-	21	-
Variable remuneration from 2021	23	-	24	-
Variable remuneration from 2020	26	-	18	-
Variable remuneration from 2019	20	-	21	-
Variable remuneration from 2018	8	-	5	-
Variable remuneration from 2017	-	-	-	-

<sup>1)</sup> This includes: expenses for non-cash benefits within the usual scope, which are subject to taxation.

<sup>2)</sup> Breakdown of the variable remuneration received by the member of the Management Board in the 2025 and 2024 financial years, respectively, relating to previous years.

The portions of variable remuneration received in the 2025 financial year from multi-year remuneration relating to previous years are, due to the performance of the share-based variable remuneration, a total of €17,000 lower than the amount set at the start of the vesting period in each case.

## 6. REMUNERATION GRANTED AND PAYABLE TO FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD

The following table shows the remuneration granted and payable in the 2025 financial year to members of the Management Board who left prior to the 2025 financial year, in accordance with Section 162(1) sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). In accordance with Section 162(5), second sentence, of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), personal details for former members of the Management Board are omitted provided they left the Management Board by 31 December 2015.

Andreas Arndt

Member of the Management Board until 14 April 2024

Inflow

In €'000	2025
Pensions	
Pension	286
Supplementary, voluntary disclosures	
Multi-year variable remuneration for the year 2024	14
Multi-year variable remuneration for the year 2023	102
Multi-year variable remuneration for 2022	32
Multi-year variable remuneration for 2021	30
Multi-year variable remuneration for 2020	34
Multi-year variable remuneration for 2019	24
Multi-year variable remuneration for 2018	10

The portions of variable remuneration received in the 2025 financial year from multi-year remuneration relating to previous years are, due to the performance of the share-based variable remuneration, a total of €20,000 lower than the amount set at the start of the vesting period.

In 2024, Andreas Arndt received fixed remuneration and variable remuneration for the period of his active employment. Further details can be found in the remuneration report for 2024.

Dr Bernhard Scholz received a pension payment of €34,000 in 2025. Former members of the Management Board who left the company before 31 December 2015 received pension payments totalling €4,614,000 in 2025.

## 7. MAXIMUM REMUNERATION

The Supervisory Board has set a maximum remuneration for the members of the Management Board.

The maximum remuneration represents the upper limit of the total remuneration to be granted for a financial year, i.e. the sum of all remuneration amounts granted for the financial year in question, including the annual basic salary, performance-related variable remuneration, pension costs for the company pension scheme and fringe benefits.

The maximum remuneration does not represent the level of remuneration targeted by the Supervisory Board or deemed mandatory as appropriate. It merely sets an absolute upper limit to avoid disproportionately high remuneration for the Management Board. It must therefore be clearly distinguished from the target total remuneration.

The maximum remuneration is €2,200,000 for the Chairman of the Management Board and €2,000,000 for each ordinary member of the Management Board. Should the maximum remuneration for a financial year be exceeded, the amount of the performance-related variable remuneration payable for the financial year in question will be reduced accordingly.

The remuneration actually granted or promised to a member of the Management Board may exceed the specified maximum remuneration during the first twelve months following the commencement of their employment. This is subject to the condition that it is permissible under regulatory requirements and that, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board enters into agreements to compensate for lost remuneration entitlements arising from a previous employment relationship and/or agrees on sign-on bonuses and/or guaranteed variable remuneration of an appropriate amount with the new member of the Management Board in order to recruit new members of the Management Board.

As the fifth and final (share-based) deferral portion of the variable remuneration for the 2025 financial year will not become due until 2031, the final assessment of compliance with the maximum remuneration can only be reported in a subsequent financial year.

Irrespective of the specified maximum remuneration, the payment amounts for performance-related variable remuneration in a calendar year are also limited to 150% of the individually agreed calculatory reference value.

## 8. OTHER PROVISIONS

No entitlement to severance pay is agreed either in the service contracts of the members of the Management Board or elsewhere. In particular, the service contracts of the members of the Management Board contain no provision regarding severance pay following a change of control. There are also no compensation agreements within the meaning of section 315a, sentence 1, no. 9 of the German Commercial Code (HGB) that have been entered into with members of the Management Board or employees in the event of a takeover bid.

It has, however, been agreed that in the event of premature termination of service on the Management Board without good cause, any severance payment agreed for members of the Management Board shall be subject to an upper limit of two years' remuneration. The two years' remuneration represents twice the sum of the annual base remuneration for the preceding calendar year and the portion of the variable remuneration calculated for the preceding calendar year that is attributable exclusively to the institution's performance. The Supervisory Board is entitled to set the proportion of the calculated variable remuneration to be taken into account for a calendar year at a higher or lower level. This is subject to there being sufficient evidence that the institution's performance in the current calendar year will be higher or lower than that of the preceding calendar year. The severance payment would also be limited in that it may not exceed the remaining term of the employment contract.

To the best of the Company's knowledge, no member of the Management Board was promised or granted any benefits by a third party in relation to their role as a member of the Management Board during the past financial year.

## 9. PENSION COMMITMENTS

Individual pension commitments have been granted to the members of the Management Board in office in 2025, covering retirement benefits and benefits in the event of occupational disability or incapacity to work.

### a. Defined contribution pension commitments

	Pension contribution	Retirement benefits	Pension adjustment
Kay Wolf	EUR 175,000	from the age of 63	Warranty adjustment 1%
Dr. Pamela Hoerr	EUR 310,000	from the age of 63	Warranty adjustment 1%
Jörn Joseph	EUR 175,000	from the age of 63	Warranty adjustment 1%
Markus Schulte	EUR 310,000	from the age of 63	Warranty adjustment 1%

Figure 8: Defined contribution pension commitments

**b. Defined benefit commitments**

	Supply costs	Basic annual remuneration	Retirement benefits	Pension adjustment
Thomas Köntgen	5.2% basic annual remuneration, maximum 55%	EUR 500,000 (entitlements until 31.12.2021) EUR 525,000 (entitlements from 01.01.2022)	from the age of 62 years of age	pursuant to § 16 BetrAVG
Andreas Schenk	5.2% basic annual remuneration, maximum 50%	EUR 500,000 (entitlements until 31.12.2021) EUR 525,000 (entitlements from 01.01.2022)	from the age of 63 years of age	pursuant to § 16 BetrAVG

Figure 9: Defined benefit commitments

**c. Other provisions**

In the event of the death of a member of the Management Board, surviving dependants are entitled to a pension or a corresponding lump-sum payment. Surviving spouses/civil partners and children from a marriage or civil partnership entered into by a member of the Management Board after retirement are not entitled to survivors' benefits or orphan's benefits.

**d. Pension commitments to Management Board members in office during the 2025 financial year of pbb (defined benefit obligations) in accordance with IFRS<sup>1)</sup>**

in €'000	2025				2024			
	Present value of during the financial year pension entitlements	Interest expense	Post-service service cost	Pension as at 31 December 2025	Present value of during the financial year pension entitlements	Interest expense	Post-service service cost	Pension as at 31 December 2024
Thomas Köntgen	403	197	-	9,199	578	179	-	9,199
Andreas Schenk	-	157	-	9,199	455	143	-	9,199
<b>Total</b>	<b>403</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>9,199</b>	<b>1,033</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>10,184</b>

<sup>1)</sup> Figures exclude deferred compensation.

Kay Wolf, Dr Pamela Hoerr, Jörn Joseph and Marcus Schulte have defined contribution pension plans (no defined benefit pension plans), meaning that no pension liabilities need to be recognised in the balance sheet.

The pension liability for Andreas Arndt arising from his employment relationship amounts to €5,209 thousand as at 31 December 2025 (as at 31 December 2024: 6,029), and for Dr Bernhard Scholz arising from his employment as at 31 December 2025 is €260 thousand (as at 31 December 2024: €300 thousand). The pension obligations for the other former members of the Management Board who left the company before 31 December 2015 amount to €40,471 thousand as at 31 December 2025.

**e. Pension commitments to Management Board members in office in the 2025 financial year of pbb (defined benefit commitments) in accordance with HGB<sup>1)</sup>**

	2025		2024	
in € thousand	Pension provisions as at 31 December 2025	Additions to pension provisions	Pension provisions as at 31 December 2024	Additions to pension provisions
Thomas Köntgen	7,820	139	7,681	496
Andreas Schenk	6,278	-389	6,667	377
Total	14,098	-250	14,348	873

<sup>1)</sup> Figures exclude deferred compensation.

Kay Wolf, Dr Pamela Hoerr, Jörn Joseph and Marcus Schulte have defined-contribution pension plans (no defined-benefit pension plans), meaning that no pension liabilities need to be recognised in the balance sheet.

The pension provisions for Andreas Arndt arising from his employment amount to €6,810 thousand as at 31 December 2025 (as at 31 December 2024: €7,456 thousand), and for Dr Bernhard Scholz arising from his employment as at 31 December 2025 €337 thousand (as at 31 December 2024: €369 thousand). The pension provisions for the other former members of the Management Board who left before 31 December 2015 amount to €47,938 thousand as at 31 December 2025.

**f. Pension commitments to members of the pbb Management Board in office in the 2025 financial year (defined contribution pension schemes)**

	2025	2024
in € thousand	Fair value of the pension obligation	Fair value of the pension commitment
Kay Wolf	309	152
Dr Pamela Hoerr	608	300
Jörn Joseph	92	-
Marcus Schulte	2,321	1,984
Total	3,330	2,436

## 10. CONCLUSION OR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

During discussions regarding the extension of his contract, Andreas Schenk and pbb agreed on the best terms that Andreas Schenk would leave pbb by March 2025 at the latest. As compensation for the early termination of his employment contract, Andreas Schenk received a severance payment of €555,000 gross. The fixed remuneration amounted to €43,750 per full month for the period up to 15 December 2024 and €78,750 per full month for the period from 16 December 2024 until the termination date. For the year 2024, the previous calculatory reference value of €270,000 applied on a pro rata basis until 15 December 2024. With effect from 16 December 2024, the calculatory reference value was reduced to €160,000 per full calendar year.

With the start of the term of office of the new CRO, Jörn Joseph, his Management board contract came into force on 1 June 2025. Jörn Joseph's fixed remuneration amounts to €660,000 gross per annum. The calculatory reference value is €270,000 per annum. Jörn Joseph is also entitled to a defined-contribution pension scheme with an annual pension contribution of €175,000. He is granted fringe benefits (non-cash benefits) to the same extent as the other members of the Management Board. Against the backdrop of the need for stability, the Supervisory Board considered the appointment of Jörn Joseph as the new CRO to be of particular importance in the current situation. He was therefore granted a one-off sign-on bonus of €200,000 gross, which became payable at the start of his term of office.

In addition, Ms Barkha Mehmedagic will join the bank on 1 March 2026, initially as a general representative. Following the relevant consultation with the supervisory authority and her subsequent appointment to the Management Board, the Management Board service contract previously agreed with her will come into force. Barkha Mehmedagic's fixed remuneration will then amount to €660,000 gross per year. The calculatory reference value is €270,000 per year. The annual pension contribution for the defined-contribution pension scheme is €175,000. She will be granted fringe benefits (non-cash benefits) to the same extent as the other members of the Management Board.

## 11. TEMPORARY DEVIATION FROM THE REMUNERATION SYSTEM

The Supervisory Board may temporarily deviate from the remuneration system for members of the Management Board (procedures and regulations governing the remuneration structure) and its individual components, as well as from the individual remuneration components, or introduce new remuneration components, if this is necessary in the interests of the long-term well-being of the company. Such exceptional cases arise in particular where deviations are appropriate for the implementation of regulatory or statutory requirements or for the fulfilment of legal obligations.

In addition, the maximum remuneration and/or the relative weighting of the remuneration components may differ for any new appointments, in particular where, within the framework of regulatory requirements, agreements are made to compensate for lost remuneration entitlements arising from a previous employment relationship with a third party not belonging to the pbb Group, and/or sign-on bonuses and/or guaranteed variable remuneration of an appropriate amount are agreed.

The Supervisory Board has made use of this option twice to date. Kay Wolf was granted a one-off sign-on bonus of €250,000 gross, which became due at the start of the appointment period. Against the backdrop of the necessary strategic development, the Supervisory Board considered the recruitment of Mr Wolf as the new Chairman of the Management Board to be of particular importance in the current situation. The Supervisory Board therefore decided on this temporary deviation. Similarly, against the backdrop of the necessary stability, the recruitment of Jörn Joseph as the new CRO was, in the current situation, of particular importance from the Supervisory Board's perspective. He was therefore granted a one-off sign-on bonus of €200,000 gross, which became payable at the start of the term of office.

## III. Supervisory Board

The remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board is governed by Section 11 of the Company's Articles of Association and was last adjusted by resolution of the Annual General Meeting in 2022. The remuneration system for the Supervisory Board complies with the requirements of company and supervisory law.

Pursuant to § 11(1) of the Company's Articles of Association, members of the Supervisory Board receive an annual basic remuneration of €40,000 p.a. Notwithstanding this, the Chairman receives a basic remuneration of €85,000 p.a. and the Deputy Chairman €55,000 p.a.

Remuneration for service on a Supervisory Board committee is paid at the following rate:

in thousands of €	Chairman	Member
Presidial and Nomination Committee	23.5	13.5
Audit Committee	33.5	18.5
Risk Management and Liquidity Strategy Committee	32.5	17.5
Remuneration Control Committee	22.5	12.5

Members of the Supervisory Board receive their remuneration plus any applicable statutory VAT. However, under the current legal framework, the remuneration of the Supervisory Board is not subject to VAT due to the specific structure of the remuneration system.

Furthermore, members of the Supervisory Board are reimbursed for their reasonable expenses.

pbb may take out liability insurance on behalf of the members of the Supervisory Board up to a total sum insured of €200 million per annum which covers statutory liability arising from Supervisory Board activities (including activities in Supervisory Board committees) and, where applicable, statutory liability for Management functions of Supervisory Board members in subordinate affiliated companies.

pbb has taken out corresponding liability insurance which, in addition to the members of the Supervisory Board, also covers the members of the Management Board and certain other employees of the pbb Group, with a sum insured of €175 million. The Management Board and the Supervisory Board are convinced that the sum insured is sufficient in view of their risk profile. The costs of this insurance are borne by pbb. In 2022, pbb also took out supplementary insurance to extend the insurance cover for legacy risks.

Remuneration granted and payable to members of the Supervisory Board in office and who have stepped down in the financial years 2025 and 2024<sup>1)</sup>

in €'000 <sup>2)</sup>	2025					2024
	Basic remuneration	as a % of remuneration	Remuneration for committee work	as a % of remuneration	Total	Total
Dr Louis Hagen	85	51%	82	49%	167	167
Hanns-Peter Storr	55	48%	59	52%	114	106
Karim Bohn	40	53%	36	47%	76	71
Gertraud Dirscherl	40	34%	77	66%	117	117
Prof. Dr Kerstin Hennig	40	70%	18	30%	58	58
Susanne Klöß-Braekler (until 5 June 2025)	17	61%	11	39%	28	66
Britta Lehfeldt (from 5 June 2025)	23	77%	7	23%	30	-
Georg Kordick <sup>3</sup> (until 5 June 2025)	17	74%	6	26%	23	45
Theresia Kirmaier <sup>3</sup> (from 5 June 2025)	23	77%	7	23%	30	-
Olaf Neumann <sup>3</sup>	40	68%	19	32%	59	47
Heike Theißen (until 30 September 2024) <sup>3)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	39
Jennifer Wendels (from 1 October 2024) <sup>3)</sup>	40	77%	12	23%	52	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>334</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>729</b>

<sup>1)</sup> The costs of the D&O insurance, which also covers members of the Supervisory Board, are not shown separately in this table, as pbb has taken out group insurance for this purpose. In addition to the members of the Supervisory Board, this also covers the members of the Management Board and certain other employees of the pbb Group. The total cost of this D&O insurance amounts to approximately €1.427 million per annum, plus insurance tax. Also not shown are the remunerations received by the employee representatives on the Supervisory Board under the employment contracts agreed with them.

<sup>2)</sup> When figures are stated, minor discrepancies may arise in totals due to rounding. Discrepancies compared to the note "Business relationships with related parties" in the pbb Group's 2025 Annual Report are due to values rounded to the nearest thousand euros.

<sup>3)</sup> Employee representatives.

## IV. Comparative presentation of earnings performance and annual changes in remuneration

The following table presents, in accordance with Section 162(1) sentence 2 no. 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the pbb Group's earnings performance, the annual change in the remuneration of the members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board, and the annual change in the average remuneration of employees on a full-time equivalent basis over the last five financial years.

Earnings performance is presented on the basis of the pbb Group's profit before tax and operating income. For the members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board, the remuneration granted and payable in the respective financial year is presented in accordance with Section 162(1), sentence 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The presentation of the average remuneration of employees is based on the workforce of the pbb Group (employees, excluding interns, temporary staff and working students). In the 2025 financial year, the workforce averaged 824 employees (full-time equivalents). The average remuneration of employees comprises personnel expenses for wages and salaries, fringe benefits, employer's social security contributions and any variable remuneration components granted for the financial year, irrespective of when they fall due. Both the earnings performance and employee remuneration thus relate economically to a single financial year.

Minor discrepancies may arise in the totals due to rounding.

### Earnings performance

in € million	2021	2022	Change in %	2023	Change in %	2024	Change in %	2025	Change in %
Profit before tax	242	213	-12%	90	-58%	104	16%	-250	-340%
Operating income	591	531	-10%	603	14%	543	-10%	422	-22%

### Average employee remuneration<sup>1)</sup>

in thousands of €	2021	2022	Change in %	2023	Change in %	2024	Change in %	2025	Change in %
pbb Group workforce	147	146	0%	150	3%	152	1%	151	-1%

<sup>1)</sup> The remuneration includes (positive and negative) inflows from multi-year variable remuneration based on the performance of share-based remuneration.

## Remuneration of the current members of the Management Board

in €'000		2021	2022	Change in %	2023	Change in %	2024	Change in %	2025	Change in %
Kay Wolf (since 02/2024)	Remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	1,389	-	1,180	-15%
	Share-based inflow from previous years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dr Pamela Hoerr (since 01/2024)	Remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	757	-	733	-3%
	Share-based inflow from previous years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Thomas Köntgen (since 10/2014)	Remuneration	768	787	2%	777	-1%	788	2%	731	-7%
	Share-based inflow from previous years	(-32) <sup>1)</sup>	(+14) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-23) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-72) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-17) <sup>1)</sup>	-
Jörn Joseph (since 06/2025)	Remuneration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	693	-
	Share-based inflow from previous years	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Marcus Schulte (since 01/2019)	Remuneration	766	784	2%	788	1%	779	-1%	730	-6%
	Share-based inflow from previous years	(-21) <sup>1)</sup>	(+14) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-14) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-53) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-10) <sup>1)</sup>	-
Andreas Schenk (until 03/2025)	Remuneration	757	781	3%	773	-1%	797	4%	784	-2%
	Share-based inflow from previous years	(-32) <sup>1)</sup>	(+14) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-23) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-72) <sup>1)</sup>	-	(-17) <sup>1)</sup>	-

<sup>1)</sup> Positive and negative inflows from multi-year variable remuneration based on the performance of share-based remuneration.

Due to the share-based performance of the multi-year variable remuneration, the inflow for Dr Bernhard Scholz in 2021 is €4,000 lower, and in 2023 and 2024 €3,000 lower in each case than the amount set prior to the start of the respective holding period; in 2022, it is €1,000 higher.

Due to the share-based performance of the multi-year variable remuneration, the payment to Andreas Arndt in 2021 is €36,000, in 2023 by €26,000, in 2024 by €89,000 and in 2025 by €20,000 lower than the amount set prior to the start of the respective holding period, and in 2022 by €19,000 higher.

## Remuneration of current and former members of the Supervisory Board

in € thousand	2021	2022 <sup>5)</sup>	Change change in %	2023 <sup>5)</sup>	Change Change in %	2024 <sup>5)</sup>	Change change in %	2025 <sup>5)</sup>	Change change in %
Dr Günther Bräunig (until 25 May 2023)	154	173	12%	66 <sup>4)</sup>	-62%	-	-	-	-
Dr Louis Hagen (from 25 May 2023)	-	-	-	101 <sup>3)</sup>	-	167	65% <sup>6)</sup>	167	0%
Gertraud Dirscherl (from 2 February 2022)	-	87 <sup>3)</sup>	-	104	20%	117	13%	117	0%
Dr Jutta Dönges (until 24 March 2021)	21 <sup>4)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dr Thomas Duhnkrack (until 15 November 2023)	70	72	3%	63 <sup>4)</sup>	-13%	-	-	-	-
Karim Bohn (from 30 November 2023)	-	-	-	4 <sup>3)</sup>	-	71	1675% <sup>6)</sup>	76	7%
Dr Christian Gebauer-Rochholz <sup>1)</sup> (until 12 May 2021)	18 <sup>4)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Prof. Dr Kerstin Hennig (from 19 July 2022)	-	25 <sup>3)</sup>	-	58	132%	58	0%	58	0%
Theresia Kirmaier <sup>1)</sup> (from 5 June 2025)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31 <sup>3)</sup>	-
Dagmar Kollmann <sup>2)</sup> (until 31 October 2021)	108 <sup>4)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Susanne Klöß-Braekler (until 5 June 2025)	49 <sup>3)</sup>	66	35%	66	0%	66	0%	28 <sup>4)</sup>	-58% <sup>6)</sup>
Georg Kordick <sup>1)</sup> (until 5 June 2025)	48	40	-17%	40	0%	45	13%	23 <sup>4)</sup>	-49% <sup>6)</sup>
Britta Lehfeld (from 5 June 2025)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30 <sup>3)</sup>	-
Olaf Neumann <sup>1)</sup> (from 12 May 2021)	30 <sup>3)</sup>	40	33%	40	0%	47	18%	59	25%
Joachim Plesser (until 12 May 2021)	45 <sup>4)</sup>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oliver Puhl (until 19 May 2022)	68	22 <sup>4)</sup>	-68%	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hanns-Peter Storr (from 12 May 2021)	71 <sup>3)</sup>	106	49%	106	0%	106	0%	114	8%
Heike Theißing (until 30 September 2024 <sup>1)</sup> )	62	53	-15%	53	0%	39 <sup>4)</sup>	-26% <sup>6)</sup>	-	-
Jennifer Wendels (from 1 October 2024 <sup>1)</sup> )	-	-	-	-	-	13 <sup>3)</sup>	-	52	300% <sup>6)</sup>

<sup>1)</sup> Employee representatives

<sup>2)</sup> No statutory VAT due to residence abroad. pbb pays the supervisory board tax on behalf of the supervisory board member.

<sup>3)</sup> Remuneration in the year of appointment

<sup>4)</sup> Remuneration in the year of departure

<sup>5)</sup> In accordance with a change in case law regarding the VAT liability of Supervisory Board remuneration, no VAT was payable on remuneration from 2022 onwards.

<sup>6)</sup> Joining or leaving. On an annualised basis, there was no percentage change compared with the previous year.

## V. Employees

### 1. REMUNERATION COMPONENTS

The total remuneration of executives and employees in the 2025 financial year comprises the following elements:

- > **Non-performance-related remuneration (monetary remuneration)** including social security contributions and fringe benefits
- > **Performance-related variable remuneration**

### 2. NON-PERFORMANCE-RELATED REMUNERATION

All employees receive an **annual fixed salary**, which is generally reviewed as part of an annual standard process and adjusted where necessary. When determining the fixed salary, the pbb Group bases its decisions on role- and country-specific market comparisons. The appropriateness and marketability of the fixed salaries, as well as compliance with regulatory requirements, are reviewed by external, independent remuneration and legal advisers.

In accordance with tax and social security legislation, further **social and fringe benefits** are also provided. With regard to occupational pensions, various occupational pension schemes are in place.

### 3. PERFORMANCE-RELATED VARIABLE REMUNERATION

The key elements of **the variable remuneration system** are structured **uniformly** for members of the Management Board and employees. This applies to the following elements:

- > Eligibility assessment for **determining the total amount of variable remuneration**
- > the **metric** for risk-adjusted performance measurement at institutional level
- > maximum target achievement level (150%)
- > **Payout structure for risk takers**
- > Determination of the variable remuneration component based on **an individual calculatory reference value**
- > **Prohibition of hedging transactions**

#### Performance measurement

**Performance measurement** for employees is also carried out **on three levels**: institution, organisational unit (division) and individual performance. Variable remuneration is allocated at division and individual level based on the achievement of qualitative and quantitative targets – where possible with reference to the pbb Group's business and risk strategy – for each division and for each employee.

The three levels of performance measurement are linked together for the calculation of variable remuneration. To this end, pbb aggregates the employees' calculatory reference values into a bonus pool, the size of which is determined by the institution's performance. This pool is allocated to the divisions, with 50% based on division performance and 50% based on institutional performance. The division pools formed in this way are distributed among the employees belonging to the respective division according to their individual contribution to performance. The share of the relevant divisional pool determined in this way is allocated to the respective employee as an EPR value. In principle, the calculated allocation of the EPR value for an individual employee may range from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 150% of the relevant individual calculatory reference value.

#### Payout structure

With regard to the remuneration structure, a distinction is generally made between employees whose work has a significant impact on the overall risk profile of the pbb Group (so-called '**risk takers**') and other employees (so-called '**non-risk takers**'). If an employee is classified as a risk-taker for at least three months during the financial year, the rules for risk-takers apply to the variable remuneration earned over the entire financial year.

For non-risk takers, the EPR value corresponds to the variable remuneration. It is generally paid in cash at the end of the first half of the year following the financial year for which the variable remuneration is granted.

The requirements of Section 20 of the IVV regarding the payment of variable remuneration applicable to Risk Takers are implemented uniformly for members of the Management Board and employees. This applies in particular to:

- > the **deferral rate** (60% for members of the Management Board and 2<sup>nd</sup> level managers; 40% for other risk-takers),
- > the **deferral period** (five years for members of the Management Board and 2<sup>nd</sup> level managers; four years for other risk takers) and the rules on the vesting of deferrals (pro rata),
- > the requirements for **backtesting and malus assessment**, as well as **clawback** and
- > the sustainability **component**.

For employees who are risk takers, an institution-specific threshold for annual variable remuneration has been implemented, above which the deferral for risk takers increases from 40% to 60% (employees with particularly high variable remuneration, Section 20(3) of the IVV). For employees in sales roles, the threshold has been set at €150,000. The threshold for employees in non-sales roles is €100,000, given their typically lower variable remuneration. For employees at the New York location, the thresholds are higher than those for other locations due to the locally higher remuneration in line with market standards.

However, the aforementioned division of variable remuneration into a payout and a deferral component does not apply if the amount of an employee's EPR value determined for a financial year falls below the relevant regulatory threshold.

Risk takers for the year 2025 were identified in accordance with Section 18 of the IVV on the basis of the criteria set out in the KWG and in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/923. These criteria relate primarily to:

- > the role as a director or member of senior management,
- > lending powers,
- > voting rights in key committees, and
- > the level of the employee's remuneration.

In total, 79 employees (2024: 99 risk takers, of whom 85 were employees) have been identified as risk takers for the year 2025, in addition to the members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board. The Management Board of pbb has informed the Supervisory Board of the outcome of this identification.

## VI. Governance structure in the area of remuneration

In accordance with the provisions of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), pbb has a two-tier corporate governance structure. This consists of the Supervisory Board as an independent supervisory body and the Management Board, which is responsible for managing the company. The Supervisory Board oversees, is responsible for and determines the remuneration of the members of the Management Board. The Management Board oversees, is responsible for and determines the remuneration systems for executives and employees of the pbb Group and ratifies the amount and distribution of remuneration. The Supervisory Board has introduced a reservation of approval for the remuneration system for executives and employees in accordance with Section 111(4) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

In accordance with the regulatory requirements of the German Banking Act (KWG) and the Regulation on the Supervisory Requirements for Institutions' Remuneration Systems (IVV), pbb's remuneration governance consists of a **Remuneration Control Committee** established by the Supervisory Board and the **Remuneration Officer** appointed by the Management Board.

The **Remuneration Committee** assists the Supervisory Board in designing the remuneration system for members of the Management Board and prepares the Supervisory Board's resolutions on the remuneration of Management Board members.

This includes, in particular, the preparation of the following resolutions of the Supervisory Board:

- **Determining the total amount of variable remuneration**
- Determining **appropriate remuneration parameters, performance-related components, performance periods and vesting periods**
- Determining the conditions for the **complete forfeiture, clawback or partial reduction of variable remuneration**.

In addition, the Remuneration Control Committee assists the Supervisory Board in regularly, and at least annually, reviewing whether the provisions adopted by the Supervisory Board regarding **the structure of the remuneration system** are still **appropriate**.

Furthermore, the Remuneration Control Committee monitors the **appropriate design of the remuneration systems for employees** and, in particular, the **appropriate design of remuneration for the heads of the risk control and compliance functions**, as well as for **risk takers**.

The Remuneration Control Committee also assists the Supervisory Board in monitoring the **proper involvement of internal control and all other relevant areas in the design of the remuneration systems**. It assesses the impact of remuneration schemes on the risk, capital and liquidity situation and ensures that the remuneration schemes are aligned with the business strategy geared towards the institution's sustainable development, the risk strategies derived therefrom, and the remuneration strategy at both institutional and group level.

The Supervisory Board's Remuneration Control Committee comprises the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, two members representing shareholders and one member representing employees. In 2025, the Remuneration Control Committee held a total of six meetings.

	Feb.	Mar.	April	May	Aug.	Nov.
Remuneration System Management Board	—		—		—	—
Appointment of CRO	—					
Variable remuneration 2024 (section 7 Audit IVV & target achievement pbb)		—				
Target achievement of the Executive Board members 2024		—				
Targets Management Board pbb 2025		—				
Targets pbb 2025		—				
Remuneration report 2024				—		
Variable Remuneration Plan 2025	—					
Remuneration system (remuneration control report, further development of the remuneration system)					—	
Appointment of Remuneration Officer					—	
Remuneration system and remuneration						—
Gender Pay Gap						—

Figure 10: Overview of Remuneration Control Committee meetings in 2025

To ensure appropriate, ongoing and effective control of employee remuneration, the Management Board has appointed a **Remuneration Officer** and a Deputy. The Remuneration Officer's task is to continuously monitor the appropriateness of the employee remuneration systems. To this end, the Remuneration Officer is involved in the ongoing processes of the remuneration systems, both with regard to conceptual new developments and further refinement, and with regard to the day-to-day application of the remuneration systems. The Remuneration Officer has an institutionalised direct reporting line to the Chair of the Supervisory Board's Remuneration Control Committee, without the intervention of the Management Board. The Remuneration Officer must submit a remuneration control report at least once a year, in which the appropriateness of the remuneration system for employees is assessed (Section 24 IVV).

Munich, 18 March 2026

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG  
The Management Board

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG  
The Supervisory Board

Kay Wolf  
Chairman of the Management Board

Marcus Schulte  
Member of the Management Board  
Chief Financial Officer  
Treasurer

Dr Louis Hagen  
Chairman of the Supervisory Board

## VII. Report of the independent auditor on the audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG)

To Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG, Munich/Germany

### Audit Opinion

We conducted a formal audit of the remuneration report of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG, Munich/Germany, for the financial year from 1 January to 31 December 2025 to assess whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the accompanying remuneration report. Our audit opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

### Basis for the Audit Opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG and in compliance with the *IDW Auditing Standard: Audit of the Remuneration Report pursuant to Section 162 (3) AktG (IDW AuS 870 (09.2023))*. Our responsibilities under those requirements and this standard are further described in the “Auditor’s Responsibilities” section of our report. Our audit firm has applied the requirements of the IDW Quality Management Standards. We have fulfilled our professional responsibilities in accordance with the German Public Auditor Act (WPO) and the Professional Charter for German Public Auditors and German Sworn Auditors (BS WP/vBP) including the requirements on independence.

### Responsibilities of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board

The executive board and the supervisory board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of Section 162 AktG. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they have determined necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud (i.e. fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) or error.

### Auditor’s Responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the remuneration report, and to express an opinion on this in a report on the audit.

We planned and conducted our audit in such a way to be able to determine whether the remuneration report is formally complete by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have neither audited the correctness of the content of the disclosures, nor the completeness of the content of the individual disclosures, nor the adequate presentation of the remuneration report.

### Handling of Possible Misrepresentations

In connection with our audit, our responsibility is to read the remuneration report taking into account our knowledge obtained in the financial statement audit while remaining attentive to any signs of misrepresentations in the remuneration report regarding the correctness of the content of the disclosures, the completeness of the content of individual disclosures or the adequate presentation of the remuneration report.

If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that there is such a misrepresentation, we are required to report that fact. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Munich/Germany, 18 March 2026

### Deloitte GmbH

Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Signed:  
Martin Kopatschek  
Wirtschaftsprüfer  
(German Public Auditor)

Signed:  
Isabelle Maurer  
Wirtschaftsprüferin  
(German Public Auditor)

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